Fields Institute Communications 1999; 291 pp; hardcover Volume: 23 ISBN10: 0821805258 ISBN13: 9780821805251 List Price: US$98 Member Price: US$78.40 Order Code: FIC/23
 Since the publication of Theory of Games and Economic Behavior by von Neumann and Morgenstern, the concept of games has played an increasing role in economics. It also plays a role of growing importance in other sciences, including biology, political science, and psychology. Many scientists have made seminal advances and continue to be leaders in the field, including Harsanyi, Shapley, Shubik, and Selten. Professor Robert Aumann, in addition to his important contributions to game theory and economics, made a number of significant contributions to mathematics. This volume provides a collection of essays in mathematical economics and game theory, including cuttingedge research on noncooperative game theory and its foundations, bargaining theory, and general equilibrium theory. Also included is a reprint of Aumann's classic paper, "Acceptable Points in General Cooperative \(n\)Person Games" and of the oftcited, yet hard to find, paper by Maschler, "The Worth of a Cooperative Enterprise to Each Member". This book illustrates the wide range of applications of mathematics to economics, game theory, and social choice. The volume is dedicated to Professor Robert J. Aumann, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel, for his contributions in mathematics and social sciences. Titles in this series are copublished with the Fields Institute for Research in Mathematical Sciences (Toronto, Ontario, Canada). Readership Graduate students and research mathematicians interested in economics, game theory, and applications. Table of Contents  R. J. Aumann  Acceptable points in general cooperative \(n\)person games
Noncooperative game theory  E. J. Balder  Young measure techniques for existence of CournotNashWalras equilibria
 S. J. Brams  Modeling free choice in games
Cooperative game theory  T. S. H. Driessen  Pairwisebargained consistency and game theory: The case of a twosided firm
 J. E. MartínezLegaz  A new characterization of totally balanced games
 M. Maschler  The worth of a cooperative enterprise to each member
 G. H. McCormick and G. Owen  Bargaining between heterogeneous organizations
 R. P. McLean  Coalition structure values of mixed games
 L. K. Raut  AumannShapely random order values of nonatomic games
Economics and social choice  B. Allen  On the existence of core allocations in a large economy with incentivecompatibility constraints
 B. Chakravorti, J. P. Conley, and B. Taub  Economic applications of probabilistic cheap talk
 P. J. Hammond  Multilaterally strategyproof mechanisms in random AumannHildenbrand macroeconomies
 F. H. Page, Jr. and M. H. Wooders  Arbitrage with pricedependent preferences: Equilibrium and market stability
 N. Schofield  A smooth social choice method of preference aggregation
 M. Shubik and M. H. Wooders  Clubs, near markets and market games
 A. H. TurunenRed and A. D. Woodland  On economic applications of the KuhnFourier theorem
 J. Wako  Coalitionproofness of the competitive allocations in an indivisible goods market
