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Ruggero Ferro* (ruggero.ferro@univr.it), via Gabelli 57, 35121 Padova, Italy. *How Do I (We) Know Mathematics.*

I view the philosophies of knowledge divided into three broad groups. Some of them deduce their position about the process of knowing from general ideas about the nature of humankind, with the difficulty of justifying how do they know the correctness of their views. Some others want to be experimental, observing what other people do during the process of knowing, forgetting that they have to interpret and guess what is happening inside them, since the language is not as transparent as it is often assumed to be. Noting the difficulties faced by the other positions, a third group reverts to a mysterious unborn human capability to know. Knowledge is a personal endeavor: not only with respect to the acquired knowledge, but also the process of coming to know is very personal. Thus a fourth position can be imagined according to which a central role is played by introspection, i.e. I have an idea of what it is to know by analyzing within myself the way I come to know. To support this position one should make explicit what is seen by analyzing the process of knowing within oneself, how it relates to other people knowledge, and one should show how we can reach our actual knowledge (of mathematics in particular) through the detected process. My exposition will develop these points. (Received September 14, 2011)