1077-AJ-1755 Charles Parsons* (parsons2@fas.harvard.edu), Department of Philosophy, Emerson Hall, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138. *Structuralism and its discontents.*

By "structuralism" I mean primarily the structuralist view of mathematical objects, different versions of which have been developed and defended by several philosophers, although the underlying ideas come from much older views at least implicit in the writings of Dedekind, Hilbert, Bernays, and probably others. My own version tries to stay closer to the usual language of mathematics than some others, so that although the basic mathematical objects are "only structurally determined," no new ontology is needed to develop this idea. (For details see *Mathematical Thought and its Objects* (Cambridge 2008), chs. 2-4.)

Structuralist views have been subjected to various objections. To the extent that time permits, I will try to canvass some of them and suggest replies. (Received September 22, 2011)